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Transnationalism and globalism are complex features of the world today. One of their 
most elaborate articulations can be found in Arjun Appadurai’s influential work on the 
emerging disjunctive and hybrid nature of the global cultural economy. Following a 
critical conceptual engagement with Appadurai’s framework, including his concepts of 
hybridity and negotiation, this article argues that the present condition of intense, 
dynamic, and multiple global interactions does not necessarily and uniformly lead to a 
pluralistic world of hybrid cultures and negotiated identities beyond nationalism or 
essentialism. The very same condition is also responsible for authoritarian and paranoid 
formations such as racism.  
 
It frequently has been argued that, in today’s globalized world, the transnational flow of cultures, 
finance, people, and commodities disrupts the borders of even the most “closed” and “detached” societies. 
The nature of this transnationalism and globalism is often considered in terms of an increasingly 
decentralized or multicentered, hybridized, and complex world of multiple encounters. In this approach, 
the effects of transnational flows are not uniform at all; on the contrary, they provide accessibility to 
global and transnational forms, discourses, and commodities by previously marginalized societies and 
communities. Such communities do not merely receive these flows in a passive manner; they create and 
negotiate new, hybrid forms out of them. Media images and information seem to play a pivotal role in this 
process; they are often regarded as the major arbitrators or mediators of the emerging global 
hybridization of cultures. This article does not provide a comprehensive review of theories of globalization, 
but rather it discusses what I consider to be the essential assumptions of the concept of globalization. 
 
“Brave New World”: Beyond Essentialism? 
 
I begin with Arjun Appadurai’s “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,” first 
published as an essay (1990) and then as a chapter of his book, Modernity at Large (1996), as a classic 
formulation of the concept of globalization. This constitutive statement, brilliantly articulated by 
Appadurai, focuses on the changing nature of the global cultural scene in terms of increasing global 
cultural exchanges and the resulting hybridization of cultures as well as a strong development toward a 
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multicentered global cultural scene. Although I agree with some of the processes and tendencies that 
Appadurai articulates, I disagree with the consequences he derives from these.  
 
Appadurai (1996) approaches the global cultural economy from within a substantive sociological 
framework: the new processes of globalization and transnationalization are the long-term effects of what 
he calls “modernity at large,” and the nature of modernity is precisely that it is, first of all, a “strikingly 
new . . . interactive system” (p. 27). Large-scale global interactions are not unknown in human history, 
but cultural transactions were restricted in the past when compared with Western modernity, which has 
overcome problems of time and distance by its powerful maritime technology. As Appadurai (1996) 
emphasizes: “The intricate and overlapping set of Eurocolonial worlds set the basis for a permanent traffic 
in ideas of peoplehood and selfhood which created the imagined communities of recent nationalisms 
throughout the world,” while the paradox of nationalism was its “constructed primordialism” (p. 28).  
 
Such successes of maritime technology and print capitalism were “only modest precursors to the 
world we live in now” (Appadurai, 1996, pp. 27–28). With the technological explosion in the fields of 
transportation and communication, “we have entered into an altogether new condition of neighborliness” 
(Appadurai, 1996, p. 29). Since this reminds us of McLuhan’s “global village,” Appadurai cautions that 
McLuhan “overestimated the communitarian implications of the new media order” (p. 29). While 
Appadurai’s major concern is to offer a more pluralized and complex view of the world against McLuhan’s 
unthinking West-centered technological determinism, he also admits that today’s media create 
communities with “no sense of place”; it is a rhizomic, schizophrenic, and deterritorialized world. But this 
process is not uniform, as it leads to rootlessness and alienation on the one hand and fantasies of 
electronic proximity on the other. Appadurai’s major stake lies in his criticism of the thesis of cultural 
and/or media imperialism (Ritzer, 2004; Schiller, 1989, 1991). Beyond the apparent McDonaldization or 
Americanization of the world, he wants to argue, there is “the much subtler play of indigenous trajectories 
of desire and fear with global flow of people and things” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 29). For instance, Philippine 
affinity for Kenny Rogers or Elvis Presley is so strong that it is often more faithful to the original than 
Rogers and Presley impersonators in the United States. And yet, for Appadurai, there is more to the 
Filipino appropriative mimesis than Baudrillard’s hyperreal simulation (1983), since nothing assures us 
that it is a repetition of the same. Even if we consider the Filipino simulation as evidence of a global 
cultural system encompassing the whole world, argues Appadurai (1996), we cannot not realize that such 
a system “is filled with ironies and resistances” (p. 29). 
 
Appadurai’s main contention is that the United States no longer occupies a central role in the 
production and propagation of cultural images and models; rather, it is “only one node of a complex 
transnational construction of imaginary landscapes” (p. 31). Imagination as a social practice plays a 
fundamental role in constructing new and hybrid cultural landscapes. Proponents of the thesis of cultural 
homogenization (in its various guises of Americanization, McDonaldization, or commodification) overlook 
the fact that, when metropolitan cultural forces are brought into new societies, they are appropriated by 
native cultural forces and are indigenized in manifold emergent forms. Such indigenization is a dynamic 
and multifarious process, changing from one region or country to another. The crux of the argument is 
that “the new global cultural economy has to be seen as a complex, overlapping, disjunctive order that 
cannot any longer be understood in terms of existing center-periphery models (even those that might 
2388 Mahmut Mutman International Journal of Communication 7(2013) 
 
account for multiple centers and peripheries)” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 32). A “disorganized capitalism” as 
Lash and Urry (1987) called it, “the complexity of current global economy has to do with certain 
fundamental disjunctures between economy, culture and politics” (Appadurai, 1996, p. 32). Appadurai 
then proposes an elementary framework for exploring these disjunctures by distinguishing five dimensions 
of global cultural flows: (1) ethnoscapes, (2) mediascapes, (3) technoscapes, (4) financescapes, and (5) 
ideoscapes.  
 
It is important to grasp the relationship Appadurai establishes between power and culture. 
According to him, there is no central global power that is unproblematically capable of controlling and 
running an increasingly complex system of global interactions and the consequent processes of cultural 
hybridization. Emphasizing contemporary processes of cultural translation, hybridization, and resistance, 
Appadurai’s argument brings up a significant dimension of the contemporary cultural scene, especially 
against the homogenizing, schematic, and reductive views of media and/or cultural imperialism, which 
certainly fail to account for a number of complex cultural phenomena. To give a different example: most 
of the national cinemas in the peripheral countries are modeled on the Hollywood film industry and 
narrative structure. Such national industries as the Indian Bollywood or the Turkish Yeşilçam have, 
however, produced entirely original and hybrid narrative structures that can in no way be reduced to mere 
copies of Hollywood narrative or signifying structures. Appadurai’s description of a complex and hybrid 
global cultural scene is certainly an important anthropological corrective in this sense. Having said this, 
however, it must also be pointed out that Appadurai’s rather generalizing framework overruns itself and 
fails to give an appropriate account of the relationship between power and culture. Typical of what might 
be described as the liberal humanist version of postmodernism, there is an implicit passage, in 
Appadurai’s argument, from an analysis of complexity to the existence of freedom via the notion of 
plurality.  He thus attributes an inherent virtue to the process of globalization.1 
 
What does Appadurai really mean when he says, for instance, that there is no central global 
power? This tendentious analysis of contemporary global power is not shared by a number of 
contemporary analyses, which would agree with his observations about the complexity of the global flows 
or the emerging hybrid forms. A major feature of these analyses is precisely their focus on the new kind of 
relationship between power and culture: decentralized forms of power brought about by new capitalist 
dynamics and technologies as well as peripheral resistance create powerful lines of escape and hybridize 
cultures in unprecedented ways, and yet this does not mean at all that global capitalism ceases to be a 
powerfully unifying global system. To mention only a few, Gilles Deleuze’s (1992) analysis of “society of 
control,” Hardt and Negri’s (2000) well-known concept of “empire” as an immanent power without a 
                                                
1 In his more recent work, Appadurai has somewhat changed this view and underlined the negative 
aspects of globalization such as racism, ethnic cleansing, and violence. See his Fear of Small Numbers: An 
Essay on the Geography of Anger (2006). Even in Modernity at Large, Appadurai’s analysis is certainly a 
lot more careful than simplistic and defensive positions, which mirror and reproduce vulgar Marxism in 
reverse. For an example, see Eriksen (2007), who begins by listing what globalization is not: not a new 
word for economic imperialism or cultural Westernization, not homogenization, not opposed to human 
rights, not a threat to local identities. In short, stop criticizing it! (Supposing also that the human rights or 
local identities are beyond criticism!) 
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center, or media theorist Alexander Galloway’s (2001) interesting notion of “protocol” as the form power 
takes after decentralization. All these analyses take the concepts of power and hegemony to a dimension 
that is critical of the conventional dichotomy of center versus periphery (such as we see in the classical 
theories of imperialism), but they would not go as far as the completely decentralized political and cultural 
scene Appadurai depicts, as they emphasize the capitalist nature of the power in question. We must add 
to this that McDonaldization, Americanization, or Westernization is not the same thing as commodification. 
While the former are clearly cultural terms, the latter refers to an abstract economic process—namely, 
culture’s becoming commodity, which does not require a foreign culture at all. It is possible to have, in 
other words, a culturally plural world in which all cultures and cultural products are commodified by the 
same industrial process. If Appadurai wants to talk about a tension or dialectic between homogenization 
and heterogenization, this would be one way of doing so. (In this sense, his approach is much closer to 
classical Marxism than he estimates.) 
 
If, however, it is clear that Appadurai’s main concern is not the capitalist nature of global cultural 
economy, this inevitably brings up the critical question of what he means by the notions of disjuncture, 
heterogeneity, or heterogenization. The question is pertinent to his main argument on the disjunctive and 
heterogeneous nature of global cultural economy, since, as it has been powerfully argued by Theodor 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer (2002) in their seminal work on culture industry, capitalism is also a major 
reductive force that creates a culture of sameness.2 Appadurai would surely make an appropriate warning 
against the dangers of economic reductionism and the relative autonomy of culture, or the powerful role 
of imagination, of people’s capacity to fiction worlds. This is still no reason for us not to look a little more 
carefully into what he means by the notions of disjuncture, heterogeneity, and, indeed, difference.  
 
Interestingly, Appadurai never offers a theoretical account of these major concepts he employs; 
he only provides examples wherever and whenever some explanation is called for. These include the 
concept of deterritorialization he borrows from Deleuze and Guattari (1983). Appadurai employs the 
notion of deterritorialization abundantly, which helps him to produce the sense of a “landscape” of 
freedom, hybridity, and complexity—the very sense of his various “-scapes” as lines of flight. Although the 
concept of deterritorialization has been the “trademark” of Deleuze and Guattari (certainly their most 
widely cited concept in the social sciences and the humanities in the last three decades), those who use it 
have not always been attentive to its intricate status in their works. On the one hand, it is inseparable 
from capitalism, which is a great decoding force in which flows (capital, labor, money, or signs) are not 
subjected to an external authority: the abstract force of capital and its axiomatic of quantification create a 
uniform and undifferentiated body. We need to underline, however, that if no external authority governs 
                                                
2 For an attentive reading of Adorno’s concept of popular music and culture industry, see Gendron (1986). 
Gendron warns that, although Adorno develops a powerful criticism of music and culture industries by 
demonstrating the capitalist industrial standardization at the core of their products, his useful analogy 
between “functional” and “textual” artifacts is not unproblematic and leads to an exaggerated account of 
the extent of standardization in popular music. Criticizing reception studies’ naïve concept of consuming 
communities as well, Gendron calls for a more intricate approach that takes into account three 
components of the production of meaning: the industrial standardization, the textual difference, and the 
consuming communities. This would have been useful to Appadurai’s framework. 
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the flows, this means that power is produced by the flow itself—that is, it is immanent to the imperative of 
capital (which is the point Appadurai might be overlooking when he is critical of theories of capitalist  
imperialism).3 On the other hand, deterritorialization has another sense in Deleuze and Guattari: a radical 
break with or liberation from any origin, belonging, or fixity.4 While Appadurai is not clear on the concept 
of capitalist deterritorialization, this other radical affirmative sense of deterritorialization as radical break 
with the logic of identity is lacking in his argument; although he touches on the loss of sense of space, he 
seems to conceive it as a negative development, in terms of alienation.5 
 
                                                
3 To follow the main line of Deleuze and Guattari’s argument, it is the appearance of the state (or 
“despotism”) that marks the first great deterritorialization in history: the sign is deterritorialized in the 
flow of (alphabetic) writing, and thus became the signifier, or the sign of the sign (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1983, p. 206). And then there is capitalist deterritorialization, which is a decoding of all previous codes 
(pp. 222–225). Appadurai employs Deleuze and Guattari’s concept in a generalizing manner. Deleuze and 
Guattari are extremely careful not to use the concept of deterritorialization in this generalizing manner, as 
they carefully distinguish, for instance, two senses of “displacement,” only one of which is 
deterritorializing:  
the fact that displacement refers to very different movements: at times, the movement 
through which desiring-production is continually overcoming the limit, becoming 
deterritorialized, causing its flows to escape, going beyond the threshold of 
representation; at times, on the contrary, the movement through which the limit itself is 
displaced, and now passes to the interior of the representation that performs the 
artificial reterritorializations of desire. (1983, p. 313) 
Identity politics (whether hybrid or not) is an instance of the second, reterritorializing displacement. 
Further, for Deleuze and Guattari, capitalist deterritorialization is not the opposite of imperialism (as 
Appadurai seems to think). On the contrary, it is what makes it possible: Europe’s “schizophrenic voyage” 
is a “massive deterritorialization” that ended up in colonizing the Third World (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, 
p. 224).  
4 In this second sense, deterritorialization is what Deleuze and Guattari call “schizophrenia” (not a clinical 
entity; see, for instance, pp. 105, 175–176, 223–224, 314, 331, 335). 
5 Although Appadurai upholds deterritorialization as a globalizing movement, his reference to 
schizophrenia is actually closer to Fredric Jameson’s (1983) negative sense of a breakdown in linguistic 
and temporal continuity (see especially pp. 118–120) than Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983) affirmative 
sense of “schizophrenia as absolute deterritorialization” (pp. 175–176). Appadurai writes: 
The world we live in now seems rhizomic (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987), even 
schizophrenic, calling for theories of rootlessness, alienation, and psychological distance 
between individuals and groups on the one hand, and fantasies (or nightmares) of 
electronic propinquity on the other. (Appadurai, 1996, p. 29) 
Appadurai’s emphasis on rootlessness and alienation brings him closer to Jameson’s Lacanian and Marxist 
approach, in which schizophrenia is a breakdown of linguistic and temporal continuity, and the 
schizophrenic “is condemned to live a perpetual present with which the various moments of his or her past 
have little connection and for which there is no conceivable future on the horizon” (Jameson, 1983, p. 
119).  
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In fact, what Appadurai means by the complexity of cultural flows and encounters is better 
explained by the concepts of “hybridity” and “negotiation”: he basically argues that, despite the 
appearance of a seamless global hegemony, Filipinos, Turks, or Nigerians do not merely repeat global 
cultural forms; they indigenize and thus hybridize them; they negotiate with them to create their own 
cultural world, all of which means that we now live in a complex global cultural economy without a central 
imposing and controlling power. Indeed, the frequent appearance of the notion of negotiation in 
Appadurai’s text shows its significance for him. Imagination, for instance, is not only a form of work or 
social practice but also “a form of negotiation between sites of agency (individuals) and globally defined 
fields of possibility” (1996, p. 31). The concept of hybridity seems to have a similar value and function as 
evidence of the complex and decentralized structure of the global cultural economy.  
 
It would be unwarranted to claim that Appadurai’s argument is empirically false. Social groups, 
communities, and individuals always negotiate in struggle or resistance, and surely cultures have always 
been negotiated and hybrid formations owing to multifarious geographical, historical, and social factors. 
Rather, the problem is conceptual—that is, it lies in the way Appadurai conceives the concept of cultural 
identity. Since Appadurai’s argument presupposes a given opposition between plurality (hybridity, 
negotiation) and essentialism (primordialism, nationalism), he underestimates the degree to which his 
framework is dependent on what he simply excludes. When treated as empirical descriptive 
generalizations (in the way Appadurai does), concepts such as negotiation and hybridity make us forget 
that the process or relationship they refer to assumes a prior identity, which is identical to itself, and 
which is then negotiated or hybridized with another identity as complete and homogeneous as itself. 
Although Appadurai is critical of what he calls nationalism’s “paradox of constructed primordiality”—that is, 
the fact that the imagined community imagines itself in terms of a nonimaginative, natural, primordial tie 
(1996, p. 28)—he is not critical of the concept of identity insofar as identities are seen as constructed or 
imagined. In this naïve version of nature-culture opposition, culture’s constructed nature is seen as a 
guarantee of plurality without any further elucidation, while an entirely identitarian problematic is 
maintained. Hence, the reproduction of the paradox in Appadurai’s own argument: what is imagined or 
constructed has still the form of identity, whether it is hybrid, negotiated, or nationally pure and 
primordial. 
 
Hence, despite his emphasis on diversity, heterogeneity, and complexity, Appadurai conceives of 
these terms within a decidedly identitarian problematic. In fact, he perceives heterogeneity in a 
homogenizing manner, as pluralized negotiations of multiple identities each of which is basically and 
constitutively identical to itself. In this problematic, difference is identity—that is, another identity—and 
disjuncture or heterogeneity is what comes after such a difference, or what amounts to the same thing, 
the coming together of differences (conceived as identities) forming negotiated, hybrid cultures. As a 
result, hybridity is not an effect of his argument as the unmasking or deconstruction of identity, but 
actually takes the form of identity—that is, a morally good and preferable form of identity—in Appadurai’s 
approach. 
 
Such a structurally identitarian problematic is bound to remain blind to the complexity and 
heterogeneity of the homogenizing process of globalization, as it reduces it to a matter of encounters 
between separate cultures/identities. While Appadurai maintains a strong political view about the nature of 
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global power (as he is against the concept of a central imperial power and for a decentered or 
multicentered view), this politico-economic and social framework is articulated in terms of its supposed 
cultural implications. Appadurai’s methodological move is rooted in the well-known thesis that people are 
not passive receivers of hegemonic cultural forms (a view which admits the prior point that they are 
subjected to a hegemonic power, even though this is constantly avoided by Appadurai under the banner of 
antireductionism). This old argument, a legacy of the revival of cultural Marxism in the 1970s, is vaguely 
recast by Appadurai for the flows between cultures on a global level. The argument for active receivers 
has now gained a new shape, as it is also invested with the inherent goodness of the fact of flow: despite 
its problematic aspects, the process of globalization is inherently good in the sense that it causes 
nationalism and primordialism to lose ground and leads to an increasingly transnational, hybrid, plural, 
and cosmopolitan cultural world, potentially free of such essentialist constructions. To the extent that his 
approach calls for complexity, and in some sense it does so internally, it is futile to totally reject his point 
about the complex and hybrid nature of the emerging global scene. Yet its failure of providing a concept of 
culture that is not identitarian (a failure that is similar to many Marxist approaches of the 1970s) is bound 
up with a misconception about the nature of globalization.  
 
Distance Abolished: Just Images, or Just Images? 
 
I take the privileged example of media, or what Appadurai calls the mediascape, to demonstrate 
my point. The media is often regarded as a powerful epitome of the globalizing pressure, which David 
Harvey called “time-space compression” (1990, pp. 260–307). In fact, long before Harvey, and long 
before so-called globalization, the philosopher Martin Heidegger (1962) pointed out how modern 
technology has led to the conquest of remoteness, as we experience in the media’s bringing the world 
near (pp. 139–143). In Being and Time, Heidegger used the German word Entfernung, translated as “de-
severance”: a distancing or separating by means of which we produce nearness, bring things to our 
practical concern. When a peasant says in his customary manner that the next village is “as long as it 
takes to smoke a pipe,” he is distancing or de-severing in Heidegger’s sense—that is, bringing the next 
village into the world. The village is put away and brought near in the same act. Interestingly, for 
Heidegger, de-severance is irreducible to measured distance, even if one uses measure: “‘Half an hour’ is 
not thirty minutes,” he writes, “but a duration which has no length at all in the sense of a quantitative 
stretch” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 140). Moreover, when one is oriented toward distance as measurable 
distance, the very act of distancing or de-severing is concealed because it has nothing to do with the 
fixing of a position in space. In coming near, distance is not cancelled but kept in the peasant’s world. One 
can traverse a distance, but never the distancing or de-severance in which distance and nearness are 
opened up (Heidegger, 1962, p. 142). Heidegger’s insistence on the irreducibility of distance to empirically 
measured distance implies a desire to protect something like difference as that which keeps its distance 
even when it is covered. 
 
Although Appadurai suggests that we see globalization as producing a hybrid, plural, and complex 
world, he has in fact accepted a prior commonsensical view that sees globalization as reduction in real 
distance—as “measured distance” in Heidegger’s sense. I have already referred to the role of technological 
development in the opening of his argument, but we need to reread the passage in question to better 
attend to its deeper presupposition. When Appadurai underlines that  
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given the problems of time, distance and limited technologies for the command of 
resources across vast spaces, cultural dealings between socially and spatially separated 
groups have, until the past few centuries, been bridged at great cost and sustained over 
time only with great effort. The forces of cultural gravity seemed always to pull away 
from the formation of large-scale ecumenes, (Appadurai, 1996, p. 28)  
 
he depends on a concept of distance as metric, measurable distance. Similarly, when he refers to the 
“Western maritime interests,” “technology transfers and innovations of the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries,” and “print capitalism” leading to the “large-scale production of projects of ethnic affinity that 
were remarkably free of the need for face-to-face communication,” he obviously gives a founding role to a 
sense of growth, expansion, and progress made possible by economic and technological development 
(Appadurai, 1996, pp. 28–29). Appadurai’s conclusive statement reveals his same presupposition of 
overcoming of distances as an inherent good: “with the advent of the steamship, the automobile, the 
airplane, the camera, the computer, and the telephone, we have entered into an altogether new condition 
of neighborliness, even with those most distant from ourselves” (1996, p. 29). Although Appadurai warns 
his reader against the McLuhanian communitarian implication and refers to “rootlessness, alienation and 
psychological distance” as aspects of the same process, these issues are certainly not pursued further by 
him, as I have already emphasized above. 
 
The above passages could have been read as a necessary reference to the historical fact of 
technological progress if Appadurai had not given such progress as well as the notion of empirically 
measurable distance it presupposes a founding role in his cultural analysis. Appadurai’s reading of culture 
operates a technological reductionism hidden under the rhetoric of hybridity. For instance, he has in mind 
a kind of identification with global forms that is understood in reference to measured distance:  
 
The lines between the realistic and the fictional landscapes they see are blurred, so that 
the farther away these audiences are from the direct experiences of metropolitan life, 
the more likely they are to construct imagined worlds that are chimerical, aesthetic, 
even fantastic objects, particularly if assessed by the criteria of some other perspective, 
some other imagined world. (Appadurai, 1996, p. 35; my emphasis) 
  
Appadurai’s reference to “the criteria of some other perspective” does not change the nature of his 
argument, as the physical distance (of a cognitive subject) is a measure of imagination for him. 
 
The issue at stake is certainly not that the real, empirical distance does not matter, but the 
subjective condition the technological overcoming of distance produces—that is, what happens to one’s 
relating to difference under such a condition. As contemporary media inform us about things happening at 
the farthest places and bring the world into our living rooms, the measurable, empirical distance is surely 
a constitutive presupposition of its institutional and epistemological framework. How am I related to the 
difference of an event, culture, identity, religion, locality, or so on when it is brought near by modern 
technologies of communication? In his relentless criticism of technology and media, Heidegger observed 
that “the peak of the abolition of every possibility of remoteness is reached by television,” and he 
emphasized that “the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness” (1975, p. 165). As far as 
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television is concerned, as Adams (1993) has succinctly argued, the “world” is brought near “at 
equidistance from the viewer” and is presented at “equal availability for the viewer” (p. 50); that is, 
televisual “nearing” is achieved against the background of a general equivalence and substitutability of all 
events and all worlds. Television captures various events and information and locates them in a world that 
Adams (1993) has proposed to call “televisual.” This locating is a particular operation that might be seen 
as an equivalence of imaging, in which the heterogeneity of events is subjected to a homogenizing 
measure (which is, in the final analysis, that of ratings). Television thus reduces difference into sameness 
by creating a place of its own, a televisual world; but since this is a world or place in which difference is 
devoured and destroyed, it should indeed be described as a “placeless place” (Adams, 1993, p. 52). If we 
regard television as a major aspect of Appadurai’s mediascape, which is itself an instance of globalization, 
we might describe the latter, with Jean-Luc Nancy (2007), as a destruction of the world, or the creation of 
an “unworld.” 
 
When considered with other, similar experiences such as the rapidly spreading shopping malls (in 
which we are, in a way, inside the TV) in the so-called peripheral countries now, this placeless place or 
unworld appears as the other side of Appadurai’s pluralistic-identitarian picture of globalization. As I have 
already emphasized, Appadurai’s reference to the rootlessness and alienation caused by globalization 
remains an abstract and general statement in his overall argument. As he believes that the new global 
cultural encounters are productive of new hybrid worlds, a stronger emphasis on the argument for 
alienation, which implies only homogenizing tendencies in the global cultural scene for him, might harm 
his preferred analysis of emergent hybrid cultural forms. Nancy (2007) might be read as approaching the 
same problem from a different angle, as he insists that the unworld created by globalization is also a kind 
of world as much as it is a destruction of the world. In fact, we may see it as a world of spectacular, 
fantasmatic, and simulacral global forms, images, figures, and stereotypes flowing in all directions, 
alongside a growing obsession with and anxiety about form in general. Difference can never be exhausted 
in this world, but now its conditions have changed. What the famous director Jean-Luc Godard once said is 
an apt description of the new condition: “it is not a just image; it is just an image.” The standardized 
production of global capitalist technological imperative is resisted from within its own processes, which not 
only lead to hegemonic forms but also create lines of flight that go in multiple directions, such as 
Appadurai’s Filipinos imitating Kenny Rogers and becoming someone else in becoming American, or young 
journalists in Istanbul altering the global form of journalism in unpredictable ways as we observe in the 
Turkish left weekly, Express. It is also true that these lines of flight and deterritorializations are often 
immobilized and perverted into authoritarian, paranoid formations.  
 
Signs in Flow, Racism in the Global 
 
Almost a century ago, confronted with a previous genesis or worlding of the world (that of 
colonialism and modernity), Victor Segalen had written: “fundamental differences will never resolve 
themselves into a truly seamless and unpatched fabric; increasing unity, falling barriers and great 
reductions in distance must of themselves compensate somewhere by means of new partitions, and 
unanticipated gaps” (quoted in Baudrillard, 1993, p. 129). What is desired and expected from globalization 
is actually a negotiation or resolution of differences in and into global fantasmatic forms, whereas the very 
process of globalization takes us also in the other direction—that is, toward the emergence of 
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unanticipated gaps and the construction of new partitions. It is these gaps and partitions that are 
overlooked in Appadurai’s classic essay. 
 
“Racism,” writes Jean Baudrillard, “is one such partition” (1993, p. 129). Psychoanalysis taught 
us that racism is not originated in a racist doctrine, but the latter is actually originated in unconscious 
structures. In a strange way, a practical, everyday, and visceral, though virtual, kind of racism is always 
already there before it takes the form of a doctrine. In this everyday sense, racism has to do with our 
relationship with others, people who are not like us (a genealogy of this subindividual, everyday level may 
like to focus, for instance, on the tactics of keeping others at a proper distance and bodily politics of 
everyday movements). Psychoanalysis approaches racism as the subject’s trouble with difference and 
otherness. In 1974, the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan predicted that racism was growing in Europe as an 
unintended consequence of excessive consumerism. This pathological formation is characterized by the 
subject’s unconscious assumption that the “other” has a surplus or excessive enjoyment which he himself 
is lacking: for the Nazi, “the Jews are everywhere, running our banks, our economy and our politics”; for 
the European, “the Oriental harem is a place of utter sexual freedom and enjoyment”; and so on. 
According to Lacan, this enjoyment is regarded as the racist’s very own in the first place, so it is an 
enjoyment that has been stolen from him by the other (1990, pp. 32–33). But racism is not a mere 
residue of history; the culture of consumerism is especially prone to it because of its tendency to provoke 
constant enjoyment, its narcissism, and its aestheticism.  
 
I would like to take as my case of racism an everyday instance of what Appadurai would have 
called “imagination.” The announcement of the newly designed Turkish currency sign had mixed reception 
from the public. There was immediately a discussion on “how appropriate” the design was, and its formal 
and aesthetic qualities were criticized as well as defended by artists, critics, and pundits. The discussion 
involved the issue of the autonomy of art (interviewed by the press, the designer admitted the fact of 
imposition from the jury), the credibility of the jury itself, the appropriateness of the awarded design to 
national identity, and its modernity or aesthetic features. All this manifested and reinforced the underlying 
contemporary anxiety about national identity—as the national mythologies that repressed a long history of 
repression and violence have been challenged from within recently. But there was a particular response 
that distinguished itself from all the rest and offered a direct answer: it was discovered that the new 
design was the inverted form of Armenian currency, the dram! A small scandal ensued, naturally.  
 
 
                                      Armenian Dram  Turkish Lira 
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Who would ever think of checking the Armenian currency sign after the official pronouncement of 
the new Turkish currency sign? And why? These seem to be the fundamental questions here, which we 
should leave as questions. Supposing that it was mere chance that led to the discovery of the strange 
resemblance, what is this discovery supposed to mean? A mere similarity? If it were, it would hardly make 
news. Given the history, we know only too well what it means. A possible scenario is that of a group of 
Turks who betrayed their country by choosing the historical enemy’s sign, whether consciously or 
unconsciously. But, in fact, few of the news texts have explicitly articulated this kind of manifest racist, 
paranoid conspiracy theory. Most of them simply put the two currency signs together in a short text that 
underlined their strange resemblance. Surely this might be sufficient for the extreme nationalist and racist 
to fabricate a little story of national betrayal by the treacherous left and liberals. More important than this 
kind of response, however, is the fact of mere visual comparison and demonstration of resemblance. Such 
obvious resemblance must be thought together with other elements of the present conjuncture: the 
unexpectedly good performance of the rapidly growing Turkish economy in the middle of a global crisis 
while Armenia is much poorer, suffering from endemic crisis and unemployment (at least so in the eyes of 
many Turks), but also the rising voice of Armenian and other minorities in Turkey about the massacre of 
1915 as it is now impossible to maintain a century-old silence that has been constitutive of modern 
national identity in the 20th century. The very fact of “finding” resemblance and the performing of the 
news discourse itself are suggestive of an uncanny thought that cannot be articulated otherwise: it is the 
Armenian who has once more stolen our enjoyment from us.  
 
This instance of virtual and hidden racism is interesting, because, as a clearly global 
phenomenon, it occurs at the intersection of two different flows: financescapes (the flow of monetary or 
economic value) and the mediascape (the flow of images and signs). We need to ask a question that 
Appadurai never asked: What is it that “flows” here, as currency or image? We notice that something is 
repeated, something like a form or shape, and that there is no priority, one figure could be the reverse of 
the other and vice versa. What flows, then, is something that is repeated in both shapes, yet it has no 
shape itself. It is something whose shape can never be given, only reshaping itself endlessly. If this 
shaping anew might be what Appadurai would have called “imagination” as a deterritorializing and 
liberatory force, then it certainly does not belong to anyone, it is not anyone’s exclusive property. And this 
flow is not a global flow in the sense Appadurai understands—that is, in the sense that it goes from one 
node or address to another on a given map while being negotiated on the way or at the place it arrives—
but it is a prior deterritorialized flow, a virtual, mad writing at infinite speed, which is arrested and 
stabilized in forms, whether national or transnational (and often both), this stabilization or actualization 
being its very alteration. Each and every form that is stabilized and appropriated is necessarily hybrid, not 
because it negotiates two given homogeneous identities, but because, having neither source nor 
destination, neither model nor copy, the deterritorialized sign can only give birth to ever hybrid forms. 
Hybridity here is not necessarily an effect of globalization; it is indeed before culture or identity. What is it, 
then, that blocks this deterritorialized sign and rigidifies it in the resentful, paranoid formation of racism? 
If racism has to do with our troubled relationship to the other, to that which is different, then it must have 
something to do with distancing, or rather with a failure of distancing. This leaves us with the lesson that 
globalization is not simply a coming together of cultures, a negotiation of differences, but it is also the 
production of a structural and systematic blindness to difference, which is brought near in a way that 
might be described as appropriative or cannibalistic (ethnic restaurants, ethnic music, and ethnic 
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whatnot). Put on the cultural menu or program—that is, put at the same equidistance from the consumer 
citizen—difference loses all its otherness while being listed as different. It then turns into an object of envy 
and resentment. A globalized world will not save us from racism; on the contrary, as it has been proved 
by its recent rise in Europe and elsewhere, racism is one of the major consequences of the impoverished 
unworld produced by globalization.  
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